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Nontechnical Summary
The use of local data has proved quite successful in providing empirical evidence
on the determinants and causes of crime. However, depending on the definition
of the administrative units, attempts to infer the role of the socio-economic back-
ground of offenders exclusively from the characteristics of the resident population
at the location of crime may suffer from the presence of criminal mobility. Since,
if the units of observation are small, a substantial amount of crime is often com-
mitted by non-resident offenders. This is a problem because the extent of offenses
committed by non-resident offenders is likely related to the characteristics of the
residential population at the location of crime. For instance, in an urban environ-
ment, residents with higher income and wealth may tend to segregate in suburban
communities and leave inner-city areas for others. This tendency for spatial seg-
regation raises intercommunity mobility of criminals if the propensity to commit
crimes is inversely related to income and wealth and if offenders are attracted by
the potential gains of criminal activities in the residential areas of the wealthy.
Given the possible importance of criminal mobility, this paper revisits the local
determinants of crime distinguishing between resident and non-resident offenders.
Whereas for the former the average individual characteristics as well as the socio-
economic background are solely captured by variables referring to the location of
crime, for non-resident offenders also spatial lags of residential population charac-
teristics are employed. To take account of the correlation between crime rates of
resident and non-resident offenders, equations for the two types of offenders are
estimated jointly. In a dataset of cross-sections pooled over three years for some
430 or 500 municipalities depending on the type of crime considered, the estima-
tion approach also takes into account spatial dependence across observations, as
well as dependence across time. Moreover, due to a possible simultaneity bias with
regard to the local property value the estimation relies on GMM estimation using
several amenities as instruments.
Focusing on resident offenders, legal earnings opportunities and the expected gain
from offenses are found to be important determinants of property crime, since
the local property value as reflected in the local rent level, as well as income
and unemployment all show the predicted effects. Several other characteristics
of the municipalities shaping the environment within which crime is committed
show reasonably expected effects. For instance, property crime is found to be
positively related to the number of shops, the population size, and the number of
daytime commuters. Also, other residential population characteristics such as the
population share of juvenile males as well as the degree of family disruption do show
the expected effects. Only the local share of foreign citizens – a heterogenous group
generally characterized by immigrants with low skills – is not significantly related
to crime committed by resident offenders. But, with regard to crime committed
by non-resident offenders the local share of foreign citizens shows a negative effect
and the share of foreign citizens in the neighboring jurisdictions exerts a positive
impact. This suggests that this variable is not only associated with the supply
but also inversely associated with the demand for crime, i.e. it raises the number
of potential offenders and reduces the number of attractive targets. Also the
neighbors’ income and unemployment are found to exert significant effects on
crime committed by non-resident offenders.
With regard to property crime a comparison with a regression of the total crime
rate on local characteristics highlights the importance of distinguishing between
resident and non-resident offenders in presence of criminal mobility. In difference
to the regression of the total crime rate, the system estimate confirms a posi-
tive significant impact of the socio-economic background of offenders in terms of
poverty and inequality on crime committed by resident offenders. This difference
is interesting in the light of Kelly (2000), who finds a strong positive effect of local
inequality on violent crime but not on property crime for U.S. county data. The
results presented in this paper corroborate his presumption that local data with
small units of observation might confirm a positive association not only between
inequality and violent crime but also between inequality and property crime. How-
ever, for both types of crime inequality only shows an effect on crime committed
by resident offenders. This suggests that it is the joint presence of possible offend-
ers and possible targets of crime within a municipality which drives the impact of
local inequality on crime.
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1 Introduction
The use of local data has proved quite successful in providing empirical evidence on
the determinants and causes of crime. For instance, several studies use differences
in the risk of being detected and arrested between possible locations of crime.
Examples include studies of deterrence effects (e.g., Levitt, 1997) and studies of
the higher crime in cities (e.g., Glaeser & Sacerdote, 1999). Several studies use
local data also to infer the role of the socio-economic background of potential
offenders, in particular of local labor market conditions (e.g., Gould, Weinberg,
& Mustard, 2002) and of inequality. The latter has been studied by Kelly (2000)
employing data for U.S. counties and Demombynes and O¨zler (2002) exploring
data for South African police stations.
However, depending on the definition of the administrative units, attempts to
infer the role of the socio-economic background of offenders exclusively from the
characteristics of the resident population at the location of crime may suffer from
the presence of criminal mobility. Since, if the units of observation are small, a
substantial amount of crime is often committed by non-resident offenders. This is
a problem because the extent of offenses committed by non-resident offenders is
likely related to the characteristics of the residential population at the location of
crime. For instance, in an urban environment, residents with higher income and
wealth may tend to segregate in suburban communities and leave inner-city areas
for others. This tendency for spatial segregation raises intercommunity mobility
of criminals if the propensity to commit crimes is inversely related to income and
wealth and if offenders are attracted by the potential gains of criminal activities in
the residential areas of the wealthy (e.g., Katzman, 1981). As a consequence, an
attempt to infer the determinants of crime from the characteristics of the resident
population alone might yield systematically biased results.
This paper sheds light on this implication of criminal mobility and revisits the
empirical determinants of crime using local data. It employs a rich dataset of mu-
nicipalities in Germany, where criminal mobility is quite significant: with regard
to property crime, on average every second offense is committed by a non-resident
offender. As the dataset provides information about whether or not an offender
has its residence in the same jurisdiction where the offense is reported, the analysis
explicitly distinguishes resident from non-resident offenders. For resident offenders
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the place of crime coincides with the place of residence and, therefore, local popula-
tion characteristics are used to capture the socio-economic background of offenders.
With regard to non-resident offenders this is captured by residential population
characteristics of geographically neighboring jurisdictions. Thus, rather than re-
moving spatial dependence from the data as suggested by Getis (1995) the analysis
explicitly uses the spatial structure to identify the determinants of crime.1
The empirical investigation involves joint estimation of crime committed by res-
ident and non-resident offenders. Using a dataset of cross-sections pooled over
three years for some 430 or 500 municipalities depending on the type of crime
considered, the estimation approach takes account of spatial dependence across
observations, as well as dependence over time. Moreover, due to a possible simul-
taneity bias with regard to the local property value the estimation relies on GMM
estimation using several amenities as instruments.
In particular with regard to property crime, the results highlight the importance
of distinguishing between resident and non-resident offenders in presence of crimi-
nal mobility. Whereas a regression neglecting the difference between resident and
non-resident offenders fails to show an impact of the socio-economic background
of offenders in terms of both poverty and inequality on crime, the system esti-
mate confirms a significant impact. Thus, taking account of criminal mobility the
results presented in this paper corroborate the presumption of Kelly (2000) that
data at a small level of aggregation might confirm a positive association not only
between inequality and violent crime but also between inequality and property
crime. However, inequality only shows an effect on crime committed by resident
offenders suggesting that it is the joint presence of possible offenders and possible
targets of crime which drives the impact of local inequality on crime.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section puts forward the basic
investigation approach. Section 3 provides a description of the dataset. Section 4
reports the results, Section 5 concludes with a summary.
1In this respect the current paper is related to the literature on the role of social interaction,
which tests for a positive effect of crime in the local neighborhood on the individual propensity
to commit crimes (e.g., Case & Katz, 1991, Glaeser, Sacerdote, & Scheinkman, 1996).
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2 Investigation Approach
Whereas crime is ultimately resulting from the individual choice to commit an of-
fense, the analysis below employs data for municipalities. Thus, it uses the cross-
sectional variation in crime rates and in characteristics of jurisdictions to infer the
determinants of the individual choice. Two sets of determinants are distinguished:
locational characteristics and residential population characteristics. The former
include characteristics of the administrative units where crime is reported, such
as the size in terms of population or the geographic situation. The latter refer to
the characteristics of the resident population of municipalities as for instance in
terms of their income or their employment status. Note that, since residential pop-
ulation characteristics capture characteristics of the individuals in the aggregate,
they reflect both characteristics of supply and demand of crime. In other words,
residential population characteristics include characteristics of potential offenders
as well as of potential victims of crime.
Denoting the vector of locational characteristics with vi and the vector of resi-
dential population characteristics with yi the empirical relationship between the
crime rate and these characteristics could be specified as
ci = v
′
iγ + y
′
iδ + ui, (1)
where ci denotes the number of offenses at municipality i per resident and ui is a
residual. This simple specification neglects criminal mobility. More specifically, it
neglects the fact that a part of the offenses committed at a locality is carried out
by residents from other jurisdictions, which might have characteristics different
from yi. In order to explicitly introduce criminal mobility consider the case of two
jurisdictions. In presence of criminal mobility, we can distinguish crime at i com-
mitted by resident (ci,i) and non-resident offenders (ci,j). As in equation (1) crime
committed by resident offenders could be determined by locational characteristics
as well as by characteristics of the resident population at i
ci,i = x
′
iγ1 + y
′
iβ1 + u1,i, (2)
whereas crime committed by non-resident offenders could also be determined by
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characteristics of the population at j
ci,j = x
′
iγ2 + y
′
iβ2 + y
′
jδ2 + u2,i, j 6= i. (3)
The joint presence of residential population characteristics at i and j in this equa-
tion reflects the ambiguity of those characteristics in capturing determinants of
supply and demand of crime. If the residential population characteristics would
only reflect the determinants of the supply of crime, a simplified version could be
used, where β2 = 0.
In difference to the study of Fabrikant (1979) the data available to this study do
not report all possible combinations of places of residence j and places of crime
i. It only allows us to distinguish offenders with residence in municipality i from
other, i.e. non-resident, offenders. Therefore, assuming that criminal mobility
implies spatial transaction cost on behalf of the offender, the number of offenses
committed by non-residents is regressed also on a spatial lag of the residential
population characteristics
ci,−i = v′iγ2 + y′iβ2 + y
′
−iδ2 + u2,i, where y−i =
∑
j
w [i, j]yj. (4)
w [i, j] is a spatial weight associated with jurisdiction j (w [i, i] = 0) such that the
population characteristics of non-resident offenders are captured by spatial aver-
ages across neighboring municipalities. Following the literature on spatial econo-
metrics (e.g., Anselin, 1988) the analysis below defines neighbors as jurisdictions
located within a certain distance and relies on inverse distances between i and j
as weights.
Of course, this framework matches actual offenses with the background of offend-
ers. A possible extension is to model the full choice set of each offender and to
include indicators of the characteristics at alternative locations of crime as well.
Following the assumption of spatial transaction cost, then, also spatial lags of lo-
cational characteristics could be added as regressors. However, probably because
of the use of aggregate data for municipalities and the rather crude approximation
of the choice set using spatial lags, no significance was found as is shown below.
If we assume that the local characteristics vi,yi,y−i are not correlated with the
random component of crime committed by resident and non-resident offenders
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(u1,i, u2,i), least squares estimation of the two equations (2) and (4) will provide
us with consistent parameter estimates, which directly reveal the empirical deter-
minants of crime. As is further discussed below, this assumption is not warranted
with respect to all variables. Hence, in order to overcome this simultaneity problem
instrumental variables are used, more specifically, a General Method of Moment
estimator is employed.
As the system of equations (2 and 4) explicitly relies on spatial lags of explanatory
variables it is important to take account of possible spatial dependence in the
errors. One option is to use a heteroskedasticity and spatial-dependence consistent
covariance matrix following Conley (1999). But, in presence of correlation between
the residuals of the equations (2) and (4), joint estimation yields more efficient
estimates.2 In fact, as we will argue below such a correlation will simply result
from the way the data are generated. Furthermore, due to the pooling of data for
different years aside of a dependence across equations and a spatial dependence
across units of observation, there might also be residual dependence across time
periods. To control for common shocks across municipalities the pooled regression
includes time specific effects in each equation, formally
ci,i,t = v
′
i,tγ1 + y
′
i,tβ1 + α1,t + u1,i,t, (5)
ci,−i,t = v′i,tγ2 + y′i,tβ2 + y′−i,tδ2 + α2,t + u2,i,t. (6)
Similar to Driscoll and Kraay (1998) additional dependence of residuals across time
is taken into account by combining the spatial dependence consistent estimate of
the covariance matrix following Conley (1999) with the autocorrelation consistent
estimate suggested by Newey and West (1987).3
Whereas the proposed system of equations (5) and (6) heavily draws on the sepa-
rate information about resident and non-resident offenders, this distinction is not
2 The variance covariance matrix of the system is defined by
S =
[
S1,1 S1,2
S2,1 S2,2
]
, k, l = 1, 2.
where Sk,l is the covariance matrix of orthogonality conditions of equations k and l.
3The estimate of the four terms of the covariance matrix according to Footnote 2 is given by
Sk,l =
p∑
m=0
(
1− m
p+ 1
)
Sk,l,m, k, l = 1, 2, k 6= l,
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common in the empirical literature, which mainly deals with the overall crime
rate. To facilitate comparisons the analysis below also presents results from a
more standard regression of the crime rate on local characteristics
ci,t = v
′
i,tγ + y
′
i,tβ + αt + ui,t, (7)
where no spatial lag of residential population characteristics is taken into account.
3 Data
The dataset distinguishes suspects of crime with respect to resident offenders and
non-resident offenders, the latter classified into offenders with residence elsewhere
in the state, outside of the state or without registered residence. With regard to
non-resident offenders, the analysis below focuses on suspects residing elsewhere
in the state since only for municipalities within the state data on covariates are
available. Since characteristics of offenders are only known if the police has found a
suspect, i.e. if the police has cleared-up an offense, residence-specific crime rates are
not directly available. But, similar to Levitt (1998) who analyzes age-specific crime
rates, the number of offenses committed by resident and non-resident offenders is
approximated using residence-specific shares of suspects
ci,i,t =
Si,i,t
Si,t
× ci,t,
ci,−i,t =
Si,−i,t
Si,t
× ci,t,
where p is the maximum lag length and
Sk,l,m = (1/NT )
∑
t
∑
i
∑
j
0.5K (i, j)
[
zi,tuˆk,i,tuˆl,j,t−mz′j,t−m + zj,t−muˆl,j,t−muˆk,i,tz
′
i,t
]
,
where N is the number of observations, T is the number of periods, uˆk,i,t is the first-step estimate
of the residual of equation k, and zi,t is the vector of instruments. Following Conley (1999)K (i, j)
is a two dimensional Bartlett kernel defined over a regular lattice field with a distinct address
for each of the N jurisdictions. For K (i, j) = 0 if j 6= i the covariance matrix is the system
analogue of Newey and West (1987). Conversely, for p = 0 the covariance matrix is the system
analogue of Conley (1999). The computation is programmed in TSP and has been crosschecked
with a STATA routine provided by T. G. Conley.
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where Si,i,t and Si,−i,t indicate the number of resident and non-resident suspects
for offenses committed at i, respectively, and Si,t is the total number of suspects.
This approximation can be criticized for two reasons. First, knowing a suspect does
not necessarily mean that he or she is really the offender because the suspicion
might be wrong. But, as long as the probability of wrong suspicions does not
differ between the groups of resident and non-resident suspects the estimation
results will not be affected. Second, and likely more important, the probability
of detection may differ with respect to the offender’s place of residence. On the
one hand, there are reasons to expect that resident offenders have a higher risk
of detection as compared to non-resident offenders since it is more likely that
a resident offender is known to a victim or witness. On the other hand, there
is also an argument in favor of a smaller risk of detection for resident offenders
if they successfully transform their informational advantage into lower detection
probabilities. However, even if these potential sources of approximation error have
practical relevance, the slope coefficients in the estimation will remain unaffected
as long as the measurement error in the dependent variable is uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables.
Nevertheless, there is a further implication of the above approximation: since the
number of cases where the police has found a suspect is a random variable it might
well introduce some error correlation between the equations for resident and non-
resident offenders. For instance, if for some reason the total number of offenses
increases but the police fails to find any suspects both the number of offenses
committed by resident as well as by non-resident offenders will show an increase.
Thus, variations in the number of cases not cleared-up by the police give rise to
a correlation of shocks in the two equations which, however, is taken into account
by the system estimator described above.
The investigation focuses on two broad categories of crime: property crime and
violent crime. This distinction not only highlights the corresponding differences
in the motivation of offenders, but also differences in the extent of crime spillovers
(see below). The basic dataset reports offenses related to these two categories
for all 1111 municipalities of a major German state (Baden-Wuerttemberg) at
three different years (1989, 1992, 1995). As further depicted in the appendix there
are many small jurisdictions: in 1995 as much as 612 municipalities have less
than 5,000 residents. The presence of small jurisdictions in the dataset creates
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Property crime (per 1,000 residents)
Total crime rate 20.3 12.7 1.73 90.5
Crime rate related to resident offenders 9.63 7.12 0 50.1
Crime rate related to non-resident offenders† 8.61 6.00 0 64.0
Violent crime (per 1,000 residents)
Total crime rate .922 .588 .081 4.23
Crime rate related to resident offenders .545 .428 0 3.36
Crime rate related to non-resident offenders† .319 .259 0 1.74
Locational characteristics
Monthly rent 9.15 1.36 5.61 12.7
Shops 4.41 1.44 .959 10.6
Discotheques .041 .070 0 .432
Daily commuters .151 .097 .021 .837
Population (log) 9.30 .747 8.33 13.3
Independent city .018 .133 0 1
Border Rhineland-Palatinate .024 .153 0 1
Border Hessia .016 .126 0 1
Border Bavaria .056 .230 0 1
Border Switzerland .040 .196 0 1
Border France .022 .147 0 1
Resident population characteristics
Income 6.23 .734 4.25 13.9
Inequality .426 .037 .352 .703
Poverty 1.57 1.12 0 10.2
Unemployment 3.84 1.20 1.69 9.53
Juvenile males 6.73 1.05 4.14 15.4
Divorce 5.32 1.70 1.50 11.7
Foreign citizens 7.59 3.85 .727 20.1
The basic sample consist of 1497 observations (3 years, 499 municipalities with population of
at least 5,000 in 1995). Income is reported in 10,000 German Mark in 1995 prices. Monthly
rent in German Mark in 1995 prices. Figures on property (violent) crime refer to 496 (431)
municipalities where at least one offense is reported and solved by the police in each of the
included years (1989, 1992, 1995).
† Excluding non-resident offenders residing outside the state and offenders without a registered
residence. 8
problems because the number of offenses reported at those municipalities is rather
low and, as a consequence, small changes in absolute numbers lead to excessive
fluctuations in the residence specific crime rates. Since attempts to employ count-
data methods failed to obtain robust results we focus on the crime committed at
municipalities with at least 5,000 residents. This leaves us with 499 jurisdictions
(1497 observations), where, however, about 95 % of all crime reported has taken
place.4 Despite of the truncation of the smaller municipalities there are still some
cases where no single offense has been reported or no suspect is known to the police
in one of the years considered, such that the above approximation of residence
specific crime rates is not defined. After removal of corresponding observations
the sample consists of 496 municipalities in the case of property crime, and 431
municipalities in the case of violent crime. In each case the sample is balanced, i.e.
there are observations on all three years (1989, 1992, 1995).5 Descriptive statistics
for the resulting crime rates for resident and non-resident offenders as well as for
the total crime rate are displayed in Table 1. Note that, due to the exlusion of
suspects with residence outside of the state or without registered residence, the
rates of resident and non-resident offenders do not sum-up to the total crime rate.
At the mean the property crime rate related to resident offenders is about half of
the total crime rate, indicating that about every second offense is committed by
non-resident offenders. In the case of violent crime with a figure of 40 % the share
of offenses related to non-resident offenders is smaller.
Table 1 also provides a list of explanatory variables and shows corresponding de-
scriptive statistics. The choice of the variables is basically motivated by the eco-
nomic theory of crime (Becker, 1968, Ehrlich, 1973, 1996) which understands illegal
activity as the result of an individual’s decision comparing the costs and gains from
a criminal act. Within this framework the gain is the expected illegitimate payoff
from the considered offense and the costs comprise direct costs incurred, the fore-
4In 1995 municipalities with at least 5,000 residents report 94,8 (94,3) % of all property crime
(violent crime).
5Note that there are still some zero observations if all offenses in one year have been committed
exclusively by resident or non-resident offenders, respectively. In the case of property crime
committed by resident offenders this applies to about 1 % (18 cases) in the three years of
observations, for non-resident offenders the figure is even smaller (11 cases). For violent crime the
number of zero observations is higher (80 and 175 cases, for resident and non-resident offenders
respectively). However, as already mentioned above due to lower robustness the analysis does
not apply count-data methods.
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gone wages from legal income activity, and the expected penalty. The choice of
explanatory variables is also in line with other “ecological theories” of crime such
as social disorganization theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942, Sampson & Groves, 1989),
strain theory (Merton, 1938), and routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979).6
According to social disorganization theory five structural factors - low economic
status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, family disruption and urbaniza-
tion - lead to disorganization of community social organizations, which tends to
reduce social control and, thereby, encourages crime (Sampson, 1997). Accord-
ing to strain theory individuals are motivated to commit delinquent acts because
they have failed to achieve desired goals, such as economic success or social status.
Finally, following routine activity theory a successful criminal violation involves
three essential parts: an offender who is willing to commit a crime, a suitable tar-
get (person or property) to be victimized by the offender, and the absence of third
parties (”guardians”) capable of preventing the violation (Cohen & Felson, 1979,
p. 590). Hence, routine activities, as for instance activities which ”involve greater
or lesser amounts of time spend within the confines of the immediate household”
(Messner & Blau, 1987, p. 1037), are supposed to shape the chances for successful
criminal offenses.
With regard to locational characteristics the analysis first of all considers a measure
of the local property value. Since areas with a relatively high property value tend to
comprise a higher value of tangible assets as well, they offer a higher expected gain
from property related offenses, and, thereby, should exhibit a higher property crime
rate. Because reliable figures on the market value of real estate are not available
we use an average monthly apartment rent for a medium quality appartment as an
indicator of the property value. However, numerous empirical studies show that
property value and rent level are affected by the local crime rate among other local
conditions (for an overview see Gyourko, Kahn, & Tracy, 1999). Regressing the
crime rate on the local property value or the rent level would therefore introduce
a simultaneity bias especially in the context of local municipalities where the cost
of moving are small, relatively, and intercommunity mobility is high. To overcome
this problem, the analysis relies on the well known capitalization of amenities into
property values (e.g., Gyourko et al., 1999) and employs several indicators of local
6Entorf and Spengler (2002) present further sociological crime theories and discuss their em-
pirical relevance.
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amenities as instruments.7
Similar to the property value, the number of shops per 1,000 residents is also an
indicator of illegal income opportunities as it represents the quantity of commer-
cial targets. As shoplifting is an important component of theft we expect this
variable to be strongly related to the occurrence of property crime. The num-
ber of discotheques per 1,000 inhabitants indicates locations where illegal income
opportunities are higher due to crowding and noise. Moreover, this variable fits
also with routine activity theory since drug or alcohol abuse may alter peoples
behavior and attitudes toward crime (Roncek & Maier, 1991, p. 726). Population
and commuting can be interpreted as indicators of urbanity and are expected to
be positively related to crime, in particular, because probabilities of detection are
lower in cities (Glaeser & Sacerdote, 1999). The commuting variable also fits with
routine activity theory, since commuters are targets of crime as they spend time
outside of their safe homes. Moreover, commuting is to some extent associated
with using public transportation and thus brings together social groups with dif-
fering offending rates who usually are segregated (Tremblay & Tremblay, 1998, p.
295).
Several dummy variables capture jurisdictions directly situated at interstate or
international borders. These variables are included since municipalities situated
at the state’s border might show systematic differences in comparison with non-
border municipalities with respect to the distribution of the origin of offenders.
Another dummy variable indicates independent cities (Kreisfreie Staedte) which
are not associated to a specific county. These are units which comprise core cities
and surrounding suburbs, and, therefore, will tend to show a lower number of
non-resident offenders.
Note that the list of locational characteristics does not include a measure of law
enforcement by the police. But, since the German constitution assigns police
exclusively to the state level, local authorities do not decide on the number and
equipment of police officers being on duty in their community. With police being
7The list of instruments includes the number of open air swimming pools, theaters, and tennis
courts per capita. In addition, dummy variables capture the presence of a golf course, water
sport opportunities, an equitation area, a sanatorium, and the classification of a municipality as
a health resort, a recreation locality, or a climatic spa. Further variables measure the emission
of industrial dust, as well as the share of nature and rural conservation areas.
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administered at the state level, no detailed information is publicly available about
how police forces are located among the 1111 municipalities. Basically, the size
and distribution of police stations follows a strong central-place hierarchy and,
therefore, varies strongly with population size. Thus, a part of the variation will
be picked-up by the population size and commuting variables.
With regard to residential population characteristics the legal income opportunities
of residents are captured by the income level and also by unemployment and
poverty rates, which are inversely related to the legal income opportunities. Note
that these variables could also be motivated by the strain theory as well as by
social disorganization theory insofar as unemployment, low income, and poverty
indicate lack of success and low economic status.
Following the literature on inequality and crime (e.g., Kelly, 2000) a local measure
of income inequality within jurisdictions is included.8 From the economic theory of
crime a larger spread between low and high incomes might indicate a higher gain
from committing crime. However, as noted by Kelly (2000) disparity in incomes
will also raise crime according to the strain theory and the social disorganization
theory. Following the strain theory the failure of low income households to achieve
a desired standard of living might be particularly depressing in the presence of
high income households. At the same time, high inequality could also be correlated
with the disorganization of community social organizations reducing the informal
deterrence of crime.
Moreover, the share of residents with foreign citizenship is included. Albeit a
heterogenous group, it is generally characterized by immigrants with low skills,
which are not well integrated in the local municipalities. The population share of
males aged 15 to 24 is added since the propensity for crime among juvenile males
is known to be particularly high. As an indicator of family disruption the analysis
employs the number of residents with a broken marriage relative to the sum of
married and divorced residents.
8The local inequality measure is derived from the income tax statistics (see appendix). Ac-
cording to Lang, Noehrbass, and Stahl (1997) there is higher tax evasion at the upper parts of
the income distribution. As a consequence the degree of inequality is underestimated. However,
this is not crucial in the current analysis which does not focus on the level of inequality but on
its difference across municipalities.
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4 Results
The results for property crime are presented in Table 2. The first two columns re-
port results from a joint estimation of the system of equation (5) and (6).9 Whereas
the equation for resident offenders contains only local characteristics the equation
for non-resident offenders includes also residential population characteristics of
neighboring jurisdictions, i.e. spatial lags. As discussed above the regressions use
several local amenity variables as instruments for the monthly rent level. Accord-
ing to the J-statistic of the overidentifying restrictions there is no indication of a
specification problem. This confirms the choice of instrumental variables and, at
the same time, the exclusion of resident population characteristics at neighboring
municipalities from equation (5), since the estimation of both equations makes use
of the full set of instruments.
The results for locational characteristics largely confirm the theoretical expecta-
tions. The monthly rent level shows a significant positive effect on crime com-
mitted by resident as well as by non-resident offenders. This suggests that the
rent level and thus the property value is positively related with the demand for
crime. However, in so far as the population structure differs with the rent level of a
municipality, one might argue that also the supply of crime could vary (inversely)
with the rent level. For non-resident offenders this would imply that the monthly
rent level at neighboring jurisdictions should be included as a regressor. But, the
additional inclusion of a spatial lag of the monthly rent level, instrumented with
spatial lags of the amenities did not yield any significance.10
Aside of the rent level also other locational characteristics tend to raise crime.
The number of shops is associated with an increase in crime irrespective of the
residence of the offender. Discotheques show significant positive effects on crime
committed by non-resident offenders. Population size as well as commuting show
positive effects on crime committed by both resident and non-resident offenders,
which supports the view of cities offering a crime prone environment. As in the
case of the monthly rent level one might wonder whether the population size of
9Even though the system estimate is preferred the difference to the results from single esti-
mation (available upon request) is rather small.
10The corresponding test of a restriction of an extended model based on the difference in the
J-statistic yields a χ2 of .037 at 1 degrees of freedom with P-value .847.
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Table 2: Local Determinants of Property Crime
Dep. variable Resid. off. Non-resid. off. Total crime
Equation (5) (6) (7)
Locational characteristics at the location of crime
Monthly rent .726 (.204) ?? .993 (.530) ? 2.34 (.741) ?
Shops .683 (.095) ?? .855 (.108) ?? 1.61 (.218) ??
Discotheques -.940 (1.46) 9.16 (2.56) ?? 6.93 (3.75) ?
Daily commuters 4.27 (1.21) ?? 16.9 (3.20) ?? 24.7 (4.60) ??
Population (log) 3.61 (.239) ?? .613 (.284) ?? 4.11 (.449) ??
Independent city 2.69 (1.04) ?? -4.96 (.806) ?? .507 (2.11)
Border Rhineland-P. 2.12 (.691) ?? 2.50 (1.53) 8.98 (2.58) ??
Border Hessia 2.04 (1.23) ? -4.06 (.900) ?? 2.10 (2.17)
Border Bavaria .748 (.441) ? -.106 (.526) 1.76 (.826) ??
Border Switz. 1.38 (.549) ?? -.599 (.725) 1.54 (.975)
Border France 4.18 (.971) ?? 1.57 (.631) ?? 10.5 (1.74) ??
Resident population characteristics at the location of crime
Income -1.47 (.353) ?? .005 (.343) -1.77 (.781) ?
Inequality 11.8 (5.18) ?? -1.94 (5.97) 15.5 (10.5)
Poverty 44.7 (12.5) ?? 8.16 (14.7) 32.1 (30.5)
Unemployment 108. (14.0) ?? 6.34 (15.5) 200. (34.4) ??
Juvenile males 87.5 (22.2) ?? 15.9 (20.3) 93.6 (44.8) ??
Divorce 49.0 (14.9) ?? 59.6 (24.0) ?? 112. (45.6) ??
Foreign citizens 5.86 (3.73) -17.4 (4.91) ?? -16.8 (9.00)
Resident population characteristics at neighboring municipalities
Income -.342 (.112) ??
Inequality -19.1 (15.0)
Poverty 28.3 (17.6)
Unemployment 49.9 (11.7) ??
Juvenile males 2.09 (10.8)
Divorce 5.74 (43.9)
Foreign citizens 7.98 (3.40) ??
Mean of dep.var. 9.63 8.61 20.3
Nobs 1488 1488
J-Statistic(dof.) 34.2(31) 21.1(12)
GMM estimates (standard errors in parentheses), where the set of instruments excludes the
monthly rent level and includes 13 variables capturing local amenities. With regard to resident
and non-resident offenders the results are obtained from joint system estimation. Results for
the total crime rate are obtained from single equation estimation. Coefficients are marked with
one or two stars, depending on whether the significance level is 0.1 or 0.05 respectively. All
estimations take account of time specific effects.
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neighboring jurisdictions is also correlated with the supply of non-resident offend-
ers. But, the additional inclusion of a spatial lag of population size is rejected
by formal testing.11 Consistent with the partial isolation of independent cities
from the neighborhood the independent city dummy shows different effects on
crime committed by resident and non-resident offenders. For the same reason, the
differences found for the border dummies seem reasonable.
With the exception of the share of residents with foreign citizenship in the equation
for resident offenders all residential population characteristics at the location of
crime prove significant and show the expected sign. Also the local Gini coefficient
proves significant. In the equation for non-resident offenders the significance of
the spatial lags for income and unemployment indicate that improved legal income
opportunities of the population in neighboring jurisdictions are associated with a
reduction of crime spillovers. Remarkably, also the share of residents with foreign
citizenship shows a positive significance at the neighboring municipalities and a
negative sign at the location of crime. This indicates that a high share of foreign
citizens reduces inward spillovers and raises outward spillovers of crime. A possible
explanation is that this variable is related positively to the supply of crime and
at the same time negatively to the demand of crime. Interestingly, the measure of
family disruption shows a positive significance at the location of crime. This could
possibly indicate that locations with a high degree of family disruption exhibit
lower social control as suggested by the social disorganization theory.
For means of comparison, the third column of Table 2 provides results for a more
standard regression of the overall crime rate. It shows results from the correspond-
ing single equation GMM estimation, as above, based on the amenity variables as
instruments for the monthly rent level. Whereas the results show a lot of similar-
ity, it is interesting to note that with regard to inequality, poverty, and the share
of foreign citizens no significant effects are found. As these variables show sig-
nificance in the system estimate distinguishing between resident and non-resident
offenders this failure is consistent with the view that an attempt to infer the char-
acteristics of the socio-economic background of offenders from local characteristics
alone might yield biased results.
11The corresponding χ2 statistic shows a value of .014 at 1 degree of freedom and a P-value of
.970. Also a joint test for the presence of spatial lags of population and rent level did not yield a
significance (the χ2 statistic shows a value of .616 at 2 degrees of freedom and a P-value of .735).
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Table 3: Local Determinants of Violent Crime
Dep. variable Resident off. Non-resident off. Total crime
Equation (5) (6) (7)
Locational characteristics at the location of crime
Monthly rent -.044 (.018) ?? -.031 (.027) -.019 (.043)
Shops .008 (.008) .010 (.007) .019 (.015)
Discotheques -.057 (.132) .186 (.122) .232 (.241)
Daily commuters -.068 (.111) .292 (.075) ?? .326 (.165) ??
Population (log) .124 (.018) ?? -.001 (.015) .122 (.032) ??
Independent city .292 (.081) ?? -.078 (.037) ?? .344 (.105) ??
Border Rhineland-P. .229 (.099) ?? .030 (.047) .334 (.147) ??
Border Hessia .438 (.095) ?? -.121 (.039) ?? .441 (.154) ??
Border Bavaria .044 (.037) -.021 (.032) .045 (.058)
Border Switz. .072 (.045) .044 (.035) .143 (.077) ?
Border France .192 (.064) ?? .165 (.039) ?? .452 (.090) ??
Resident population characteristics at the location of crime
Income -.041 (.026) -.013 (.020) -.077 (.048)
Inequality 1.31 (.419) ?? .331 (.344) 1.68 (.724) ??
Poverty 4.79 (1.22) ?? .392 (.811) 3.83 (1.84) ??
Unemployment 5.96 (.973) ?? -.407 (.945) 8.76 (2.00) ??
Juvenile males 1.18 (1.28) 4.73 (1.61) ?? 6.10 (2.52) ??
Divorce 3.08 (1.19) ?? 4.02 (1.20) ?? 4.45 (2.74) ??
Foreign citizens 1.80 (.286) ?? -.071 (.282) 1.53 (.509) ??
Resident population characteristics at neighboring municipalities
Income -.018 (.007) ??
Inequality -1.09 (.826)
Poverty -1.38 (.816) ?
Unemployment 1.46 (.560) ??
Juvenile males 1.44 (.603) ??
Divorce 3.04 (2.23)
Foreign citizens .329 (.197) ?
Mean of dep.var. .545 .319 .922
Nobs 1293 1293
J-Test(dof.) 16.3(31) 13.4(12)
GMM estimates (standard errors in parentheses), where the set of instruments excludes the
monthly rent level and includes 13 variables capturing local amenities. With regard to resident
and non-resident offenders the results are obtained from joint system estimation. Results for
the total crime rate are obtained from single equation estimation. Coefficients are marked with
one or two stars, depending on whether the significance level is 0.1 or 0.05 respectively. All
estimations take account of time specific effects.
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The estimation results for violent crime are presented in Table 3. Again the first
two columns report results for the two equations of the system. With regard
to locational characteristics there are several differences as compared to property
crime. Shops and discotheques prove insignificant, and an effect of daily commuters
is only found for non-resident offenders. This is, however, not really surprising
if one takes into account that violent crime does not include offenses such as
shoplifting and picketpocking. It is also interesting to note that with regard to the
rent level, a negative effect is found, indicating that areas of high property value are
associated with low violent crime. Again it has been tested in an extended model
whether the monthly rent level at neighboring jurisdictions should be included,
but no significance was found.12
With regard to the effects of resident population characteristics on crime commit-
ted by resident offenders a strong significance is found for most variables. As in
the case of property crime, there is a significant positive effect of local inequal-
ity and poverty. Only income and, somewhat surprisingly, the population share
of juvenile males are insignificant. But note that these variables are significantly
associated with crime spillovers. At any rate, the results for the determinants of
crime spillovers are somewhat more difficult to interprete than those for property
crime. However, as criminal mobility is less important with violent crime and since
violent crime is less strongly associated with economic incentives it is no surprise
that the equation for violent crime committed by non-resident offenders is less
clear-cut as compared to the case of property crime. Correspondingly, in differ-
ence to the case of property crime the standard regression of the violent crime rate
on local characteristics does not show striking differences to the system estimate
for resident-offenders.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Given the possible importance of criminal mobility, this paper has revisited the
local determinants of crime distinguishing between resident and non-resident of-
fenders. Whereas for the former the average individual characteristics as well as
12The χ2 statistic shows a figure of 1.69 at 1 degree of freedom and a P-value of .193. The
joint test on the rent level and the population size of neighboring jurisdictions has a χ2 statistic
of 3.59 at 2 degrees of freedom and a P-value of .166.
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the socio-economic background are solely captured by variables referring to the
location of crime, for non-resident offenders also spatial lags of residential popu-
lation characteristics are employed. To take account of the correlation between
crime rates of resident and non-resident offenders, equations for the two types of
offenders have been estimated jointly. In a dataset of cross-sections pooled over
three years for some 430 or 500 municipalities depending on the type of crime
considered, the estimation approach also takes into account spatial dependence
across observations, as well as dependence across time. Moreover, due to a possi-
ble simultaneity bias with regard to the local property value the estimation relies
on GMM estimation using several amenities as instruments.
Focusing on resident offenders, legal earnings opportunities and the expected gain
from offenses are found to be important determinants of property crime, since
the local property value as reflected in the local rent level, as well as income
and unemployment all show the predicted effects. Several other characteristics
of the municipalities shaping the environment within which crime is committed
show reasonably expected effects. For instance, property crime is found to be
positively related to the number of shops, the population size, and the number of
daytime commuters. Also, other residential population characteristics such as the
population share of juvenile males as well as the degree of family disruption do show
the expected effects. Only the local share of foreign citizens – a heterogenous group
generally characterized by immigrants with low skills – is not significantly related
to crime committed by resident offenders. But, with regard to crime committed
by non-resident offenders the local share of foreign citizens shows a negative effect
and the share of foreign citizens in the neighboring jurisdictions exerts a positive
impact. This suggests that this variable is not only associated with the supply but
also inversely associated with the demand for crime. Also the neighbors’ income
and unemployment are found to exert significant effects on crime committed by
non-resident offenders.
With regard to violent crime the results show some differences. The property value
no longer raises but tends to reduce the crime rate. Also locational characteristics
such as the number of shops and the population size do not show significant effects.
However, for resident offenders, most of the residential population characteristics
still show the expected effects. With regard to non-resident offenders, the results
confirm the significance of spatial lags of the residential population characteristics.
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As compared to the results for property crime the results for non-resident offenders
are somewhat less clear-cut. To some extent this may reflect the lower extent of
criminal mobility in the case of violent crime.
With regard to property crime a comparison with a regression of the total crime
rate on local characteristics highlights the importance of distinguishing between
resident and non-resident offenders in presence of criminal mobility. In difference
to the regression of the total crime rate, the system estimate confirms a posi-
tive significant impact of the socio-economic background of offenders in terms of
poverty and inequality on crime committed by resident offenders. This difference
is interesting in the light of Kelly (2000), who finds a strong positive effect of local
inequality on violent crime but not on property crime for U.S. county data. The
results presented in this paper corroborate his presumption that local data with
small units of observation might confirm a positive association not only between
inequality and violent crime but also between inequality and property crime. How-
ever, for both types of crime inequality only shows an effect on crime committed
by resident offenders. This suggests that it is the joint presence of possible offend-
ers and possible targets of crime within a municipality which drives the impact of
local inequality on crime.
Data Sources and Definitions
Municipalities: The basic dataset consists of the 1111 municipalities of the
German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW). BW covers a total area of
35,752 square kilometer (sqkm) (13,800 square miles (sqm)) with an average
community area size of about only 32.2 sqkm (12.4 sqm). For comparison
average US county size is about 1,127.5 sqm (own computations based on
County and City Data Book, 1988). The average population density is 291
inhabitants per sqkm or 753.7 inhabitants per sqm. For comparison, average
US population density is about 68.1 per sqm (cf. County and City Data
Book, 1988).
Table 4: Local Population Distribution in the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg
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Population range Number Pop. share Cum. pop. share
< 1,000 90 .005 .005
1,000 - 2,500 216 .040 .045
2,500 - 5,000 306 .108 .152
5,000 - 10,000 259 .172 .324
10,000 - 20,000 149 .193 .517
20,000 - 50,000 68 .202 .718
50,000 - 100,000 14 .090 .809
≥ 100,000 9 .191 1.00
Total 1111 1.00
1995 population figures.
Crime data: The crime data is provided by the State Criminal Police Office
(Landeskriminalamt) Baden-Wuerttemberg. The following definitions refer
to the German penal code (”Strafgesetzbuch” (StGB)).
Property crime comprises theft (§242 StGB), home and family theft (§247
StGB), petty theft and embezzlement (§248a StGB), unauthorized use of a
vehicle (§248b StGB), tapping of electrical power (§248c StGB), aggravated
theft (§243 StGB), theft with weapons and gang theft (§244 StGB) and
serious gang theft (§244a StGB).
Violent crime comprises murder (§211 StGB), manslaughter and killing
on demand (§§212, 213, 216 StGB), killing of infants (§217 StGB), rape
(§177 StGB), robbery, extortion by means of force and predatory attack
of motorists (§§249-252, 255, 316a StGB), fatal assault (§§226, 227, 229(2)
StGB), aggravated assault, serious assault and poisoning (§§223a, 224, 225,
227, 229 StGB), kidnapping (§239a StGB), taking of hostages (§239b StGB)
and attack on air traffic (§316c StGB).
Mean income and inequality (Gini Coefficient) are calculated from the
income tax statistics which report gross income (the income for married
couples is split). Income is reported in 8 income classes ([1, 10000]; [10000,
20000]; [20000, 30000]; [30000, 40000]; [40000, 50000]; [50000, 75000]; [75000,
100000]; [100000 or more], all in DM). Fore each class the number of tax-
payers as well as the mean income are reported. Whereas the calculation of
the overall mean income is straightforward, that of inequality is more diffi-
cult, since little is known about the income distribution within each class.
However, as pointed out by Cowell (1995), knowing the mean income and
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the number of occupants of each class upper and lower limits for a variety
of inequality measures can be found. Lower limits are found by assuming
that everyone in class i receives exactly the same income, namely, the av-
erage income (µi) in that class. Upper limits result from the assumption
that there is maximum inequality within each class. This implies that the
members of class i receive either the lower limit income (ai) or the upper
limit income (ai+1) but no intermediate incomes. The share of those class
members who are assumed to stick at the lower limit of class i is given by
λi =
ai+1−µi
ai+1−ai .
13 One may now write the lower (GL) and upper limit (GU ) of
the Gini Coefficient as
GL =
1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
ninj
n2y¯
|µi − µj| ,
GU = GL +
k∑
i=1
n2i
n2y¯
λi [µi − ai] ,
where j is an additional group index, k indicates the number of classes, ni
(nj) is the number of taxpayers within group i (j), n is the absolute number
of taxpayers across all groups and y¯ is the mean income across all groups.
As usual in grouped income data the highest class is reported without an
upper limit (e.g., 100.000 DM or more). This open class however is not a
problem. Although ak+1 is required for the calculation of GU , the measure
proved insensitive to alternative specification of the upper bound. In the
present study the limit is set to 1 Million DM. As GL and GU determine
the limits of the Gini coefficient it is evident that the true measure lies
somewhere in between. For the Gini coefficient we use a compromise value
suggested by Cowell (1995) by taking 23 of its lower bound and adding to it
1
3
of its upper bound, which ”[...]works extremely well for most distributions”
(Cowell, 1995, p. 116).
Further covariates are obtained from the State’s Statistical Office (Statistisches
Landesamt) Baden-Wuerttemberg. For several covariates data are only avail-
able for one of the considered years. Instead of performing the estimations
13This formula ensures that the assumed average income within the class tallies with the
observed number µi.
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without these variables and since the analysis deals with the cross-sectional
distribution anyway, the corresponding figures are assigned to all years. This
refers to the monthly rent level referring to apartments equipped with bath
and kitchen taken from the last German population census 1987. Publicly
supported housing is excluded. Even though the cross-sectional distribution
is constant the data for 1989, 1992, and 1995 are adjusted with the state
rent price index. The number of welfare recipients at the level of munici-
palities is only available for 1995. Commuting, unemployment, divorce and
residents with foreign citizenship are only available for 1987 - the year of the
last German population census. The number of shops and discotheques is
taken from the establishment census, 1993.
Amenities used as instrumental variables for the rent level have also been ob-
tained from the State’s Statistical Office. The list of amenity variables in-
cludes the number of open air swimming pools, tennis courts per capita, the
presence of a golf course, of water sport opportunities, and of an equitation
area all referring to July 1989. Moreover, the touristic classification of mu-
nicipalities (taken from the German Automobile Association) indicating a
health resort, a recreation locality, or a climatic spa as of 1987 is employed.
Furthermore, a dummy variable captures the presence of a sanatorium in
1988. Also the number of theaters per capita in 1987 is used. Two vari-
ables indicate the share of natural resort and land reservation areas in the
county or independent city. Finally the amount of industrial dust per county
(or independent city) area as an average of the figures in 1985 and 1990 is
employed.
Spatial weighting matrix: Euclidian distances are computed from a digital
map of the geographical position of the administrative center of each com-
munity. The employed matrix defines local neighbors as communities located
within a distance of 30 kilometers (km). This results from using commuting
of the working population as an indicator of the geographic proximity, as
90 % of the male commuters – as a proxy for full-time employed commuters
– have a commuting distance up to 30 km (18,65 miles). This figure was
obtained by means of linear interpolation based on relative frequencies of
commuting distances published by Heidenreich (1988). Each neighboring
community is weighted according to the inverse of its relative distance. Note
that due to a better empirical performance, row-standardization is not im-
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posed. This implies, that the total strength of effects exerted by neighboring
municipalities is not restricted to be the same across municipalities. If a
municipality is located in large distance to others it will thus tend to be less
affected by its neighbors.
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